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Human rights remain unfulfilled promises for large numbers of people throughout the world, 
despite their recognition in national constitutions and in widely ratified international treaties, 
and regardless of the availability at the national level of judicial mechanisms for their 
enforcement. People living in poverty are generally most likely to see their human rights 
violated, and least likely to enforce their rights. Improving human rights protection for people 
living in poverty is not a challenge for the judiciary – or even the legal system – alone. Yet 
judicial enforcement at the national level is where human rights can show their teeth. The real 
and visible perspective that perpetrators of human rights violations will be held accountable 
and that victims will be compensated, is crucial for the strength of any human rights 
protection system. It sustains its credibility in the eyes of the rights holders and acts as a 
deterrent towards potential perpetrators. 
With a population of approximately 140 million, Nigeria is the most populous nation in sub-
Saharan Africa. According to World Bank data, about 54 % of the population live on less than 
1 dollar per day.
3
 Poverty in economic means goes hand in hand with poverty in terms of the 
enjoyment of human rights. This paper will first present the legal provisions for human rights 
protection in Nigeria, before examining the obstacles experienced by people living in poverty 
in having access to justice for the enforcement of their human rights. It will conclude with a 
number of suggestions for procedural and institutional changes that may help further access to 




1. Fundamental Rights in the Nigerian Constitution 
 
The first Bill of Rights in Nigeria can be traced to the Independence Constitution of 1960. 
Shortly before independence, when the colonial government introduced regional 
governments, minority ethnic groups expressed fears of domination and marginalisation. In 
response to these concerns, the colonial government set up a Minorities Commission in 1957. 
Based on its recommendations, a Bill of Rights was included in Chapter III (sections 17-32) 
of the 1960 Constitution.
4
 The Constitution also introduced a political arrangement modelled 
on the Westminster Parliamentary system and retained the English monarch as the Head of 
State. In 1963, Nigeria became a Republic, and adopted the 1963 Republican Constitution 
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which did away with the monarchy.
5
 The 1963 Constitution retained the fundamental rights 
provisions. In 1979 – upon the return to democracy after a difficult period in Nigerian history-  
another Constitution came into being; this contained fundamental rights provisions similar to 
the provisions in the previous Constitutions. After another difficult period, the current 1999 
Constitution came into force on 29 May, 1999. Chapter IV of the 1979 and 1999 
Constitutions includes only civil and political rights. Economic, social and cultural rights can 
be found in Chapter II as ‘Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy’.6 
They are declared to be non-justiciable.
7
 
Nigeria ratified/acceded to many of the major international and regional human rights 
instruments.
8
 However, they do not have direct effect in Nigerian law. The status of these 
conventions in the domestic legal system is determined by section 12 (1) of the Constitution, 
which states that ‘No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force 
of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National 
Assembly.’9 Only the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights has so far been 
incorporated
10
. That the African Charter is now part of Nigerian law, was confirmed by the 





2. Legal Mechanism for Fundamental Rights Enforcement 
 
For the purpose of entertaining suits for the protection and redress of fundamental rights 
violations, section 46 of the 1999 Constitution confers original jurisdiction on the High Court 
in a State. The section further empowers the Chief Justice of Nigeria to make rules with 
respect to the practice and procedure of a High Court in connection with the enforcement of 
those rights.  
 
 
2.1. The Fundamental Rights (Enforcement Procedure) Rules 
 
The then Chief Justice in 1979 made the current rules, the Fundamental Rights (Enforcement 
Procedure) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’) pursuant to section 42 (3) of the 1979 
Constitution. The Rules came into force on 1st January, 1980. The 1999 Constitution under 
section 46 (3) provided for similar rules to be made by the Chief Justice of Nigeria, but this 
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has not been done. The implication of this is that the existing Rules by virtue of section 315 of 
the 1999 Constitution remain in force until new rules are made. 
Although section 46 of the 1999 Constitution confers original jurisdiction on the High Court 
in a State, it has been held by the Supreme Court in Jack v. University of Agriculture, 
Makurdi,
12
 that both the Federal and State High Courts have concurrent jurisdiction in respect 
of enforcement of fundamental rights, and that an application for fundamental rights 
enforcement can either be made to the Federal High Court or the High Court of the State in 
which the breach occurs.  
The Rules can only be invoked where the principal claim is in respect of a human rights 
violation. Where the violation of human rights was a mere appendage to the main claim, the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria held, in Tukur v. Government of Taraba State,
13
 that a party cannot 
rely on protection under the Rules. On the other hand, where a violation is the principal claim, 
the Rules can be invoked for other tangential claims.
14
 In Abacha v. Fawehinmi,
15
 the 
Supreme Court also held that the procedure for the enforcement of rights under the African 








In order to embark on legal redress of a fundamental rights violation under the Rules, an 
applicant must file an ex parte motion for leave to apply for the enforcement of a breach of a 
fundamental right. The application for leave must be filed within 12 months from the date 
when the cause of action arose or any longer period as may be allowed by the court.
17
 It must 
be accompanied by an affidavit in support, verifying the relevant facts giving rise to the 
breach.
18
After obtaining the leave of court, the applicant can apply for an enforcement order. 
The process of seeking leave has been described as an in-built delay mechanism.
19
 The step of 
applying ex parte for permission to enforce the right has been labelled unnecessary, 
cumbersome, and capable of frustrating the fundamental rights of the Nigerian citizens.
20
 
Another concern is the likelihood of the court dabbling in the merits of the main application 
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during the consideration of an application for leave. For these reasons, the issue of leave may 
be described as dysfunctional. 
On the hearing date, the hearing may be adjourned if the court is of the opinion that the 
applicant has improperly failed to serve any person, whether or not such a person is directly 
affected by the proceedings. On the other hand, the court may on its direction grant an 
opportunity to be heard to any person or body that so desires, even if such person has not been 
properly served. This provision has been said to give the status of amicus curiae to practically 
every Nigerian (which effectively means any interested party, irrespective of nationality) who 
desires to be heard in the application.
21
  
Generally, under the Rules, a fundamental rights application can either be brought to question 
the validity and quash an order, warrant, commitment, conviction, inquisition or record, or for 
the production and release of detained persons, in cases of wrongful or unlawful detention.  
Both section 46 (2) of the 1999 Constitution and Order 6 Rule 1 (1) of the Rules dictate that 
the court may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider 
just or appropriate for the purpose of enforcing or seeing the enforcement of constitutionally 
guaranteed fundamental rights. Although the Rules make no provision for specific remedies, 
it has been held in Asemota v. Yesufu,
22
 that the language implies the availability of certain 
remedies, i.e. order of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, as well as a certain writ, i.e. 
habeas corpus, and this list was by no means intended to be exclusive.
23
 However, under 
Order 6 Rule 2 any party disobeying a court order may be subject to imprisonment.
24
  
In Dele Giwa v. Inspector General of Police,
25
 the court awarded monetary compensation to 
the applicant who had been illegally detained by the police and a public apology was also 
offered to the applicant. In the Court of Appeal’s decision in Adeyemi Candide-Johnson v. 
Mrs Esther Edigin,
26
 the propriety of monetary compensation in fundamental rights violation 
cases was confirmed; also in Minister of Internal Affairs v. Shugaba,
27
 the Supreme Court 
stated as follows: ‘...in cases involving an infraction of fundamental rights of a citizen, the 
court ought to award such damages as would serve as a deterrent against naked, arrogant, 
arbitrary and oppressive abuse of power…However, such award must not be excessive.’  
In other words, the courts will permit the recovery of damages for violation of rights in 




3. Obstacles to effective human rights enforcement  
 
Despite a constitutional bill of rights and the availability of a specific procedure for 
fundamental rights enforcement in Nigeria, people living in poverty are confronted with 
enormous obstacles that stand in the way of their accessing justice for the enforcement of their 
rights. Some of the main problems are ignorance and illiteracy, procedural complexity, the 
cost of legal procedures, the strict interpretation of locus standi rules, corruption, the 
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inefficient administration of justice, lack of assertiveness of rights holders, and lack of trust in 
the justice system. 
 
 
3.1 Ignorance/illiteracy  
 
In the words of Justice Suleiman Galadima, JCA, ‘The Constitution may be a common 
document to those in the course of whose activities it is a regular feature. However, it is no 
gainsaying that a majority of Nigerians do not know what rights they have, enshrined in the 
Constitution…’28  Ignorance and illiteracy are indeed major obstacles to fundamental rights 
awareness and enforcement in Nigeria. The Nigerian Constitution is written only in the 
country’s official language, which is English and has not been translated into the major local 
languages spoken by the local people. Thus, given the level of illiteracy in Nigeria
29
 illiterates 
and even functional illiterates
30
 are generally not aware of their fundamental rights as 
provided in the Constitution or have no knowledge of human rights generally. An individual 
can hardly enforce rights he/she is ignorant of or take up the cause of others without being 
aware of those rights.  
In Nigeria’s 2006 Sixth periodic report to the CEDAW, it was moreover observed that the use 
of the English language, rather than local languages as the communication medium in court 
and the complex nature of the court system are barriers to women accessing justice in 
Nigeria.
31
 The same barriers apply to men as well. 
 
 
3.2 Procedural Complexity 
 
In the 2006 Assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System in three Nigerian 
States by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the report indicated that the biggest 
obstacle to using the courts as perceived by the people is the complexity of the process of 
courts.
32
 As the above overview of the Rules makes clear, the procedure is complex and 
highly technical, which makes it difficult to understand for an average person. Apart from the 
fact that illiterates cannot comprehend such provisions, a poor but literate person is likely to 
find it impossible to successfully go through a procedure without the services of counsel -  an 
expense he/she may be unable to meet.   
 
 
3.3 Costs-filing, service fees, legal fees, transport costs  
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Nigeria’s 2006 Sixth periodic report to CEDAW earlier referred to, mentions the high cost of 
litigation, including lawyers’ fees, and the inaccessibility of courts of law due to their 
locations coupled with poor transportation systems as major inhibitive factors for poor/rural 
women having access to justice.
33
 This report is reflective of the challenge faced by people 
living in poverty in Nigeria irrespective of gender. 
Protecting or enforcing one’s right in a court of law in Nigeria can be very expensive. 
Litigants have to bear several costs, such as filing fees - which in some cases depend on the 
claim of the plaintiff. An additional cost that should not be underestimated is that of 
transportation to and from court, at each sitting. For people living in poverty, access to justice 
can indeed be hindered by the impossibility to physically reach the court building. The 
inability of people living in poverty to bear any expense for transport often constrains people 
to walk to the court.
34
 The cost of attending court sittings, either as a witness for prosecution 
in criminal matters or as plaintiff in civil matters can be challenging. The Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) at a State Ministry of Justice stated in an interview with the authors that 
sometimes she has to pay transportation costs for poor people to attend court to give evidence 
in matters in which they are the victims. The DPP added that the government has to resort to 
rendering this financial assistance because victims have been seen to abandon prosecution of 
crimes owing to their inability to afford the cost of attending court sittings. 
In many states of the federation, the costs of filing fundamental rights enforcement cases are 
unduly high. In Lagos State High Court, for an action to be filed for a fundamental rights 
enforcement, a litigant might pay about N7, 500 (approx $60); to file a simple motion costs 
N350 (approx $3), while no payment is required for a claim for a liquidated sum. The Federal 
High Court fees have recently become astronomical: to file a new action may cost about 
N50,000 (approx $400) if one is making a monetary claim, while a simple motion costs about 
N330 (approx $3),
35
 in a country where the minimum wage is N7,500 (approx  $60), and the 
majority of the people live below the poverty level. In cases of appeal, the appellant has to 
contend with various fees.
36
  
Where a matter being filed includes a claim for a specified sum at the Federal level, some 
State High Courts require that prospective plaintiffs should pay a certain percentage of that 
amount in addition to the filing fees. It would seem more reasonable that such percentage 
should be payable after judgment has been entered for the plaintiff and the judgment is to be 
executed, not before filing the action.         
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Then there is the cost of legal counsel. Engaging the services of a lawyer in fundamental 
rights enforcement cases will cost not less than N50,000 (approximately $400).
37
 This amount 
is exclusive of the cost of filing, service and other administrative expenses to be borne by the 
prospective applicant. In a Technical Report on the Nigerian Court Procedures Project 
conducted in 2001, litigants generally expressed the view (74.2 percent of the data collected) 
that lawyers’ fees are excessive for poor citizens.38  
 
 
3.4 Strict application of locus standi rule 
 
Locus standi deals with the right or competence of a person to institute proceedings in a court 
of law for redress or assertion of a right enforceable in law. This concept is predicated on the 
assumption that no court is obliged to provide for a claim in which the applicant has a remote, 
hypothetical or no interest. In fundamental rights enforcement cases, it is the person whose 




The constitutional basis for the locus standi rule in Nigeria can be found in Section 6(6)(b) of 
the 1999 Constitution, in respect of which someone can only approach the court ‘for the 
determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person’, such that 
only the person whose right is threatened or infringed can apply to court for redress.
40
 The 
courts in Nigeria have been strict on the application of this rule. The court will thus not 
ordinarily entertain an action that is brought on behalf of another person, irrespective of the 
social status of the person.
41
 This has created major impediments for human rights NGOs or 
individual activists to bring actions to enforce generic or group rights. Even individual victims 
rarely succeed because they have to show a personal interest over and above the interests of 
members of the general public. Nigeria’s apex court has adopted a strict conservatism to the 
issue of locus standi on the premise that liberalizing on this front will open the floodgate of 
litigation to busybodies.
42
 Yet the consequence of the Adesanya ruling has been to frustrate 
the enforcement of fundamental rights in Nigeria for people living in poverty by public 
spirited people,
43
 and hence shutting out people living in poverty with a cause from justice.
44
 
The Supreme Court attempted to broaden the restrictive interpretation of locus standi as 
enunciated in Adesaya’s case in its decisions in Fawehinmi v. Akilu and Fawehinmi v. Akilu 
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 Unfortunately however the apex court in doing this distinguished between civil and 
criminal cases, with the effect that only in criminal matters the rule is somewhat liberalized.
46
 
Even in criminal matters, the courts still require a party to disclose a personal interest or a 
close bond with the victim of the rights violation.
47
  
In the 2006 case of Theophilus Uwalaka & 2 Ors v. Police Service Commission,
48
 a human 
rights NGO instituted an action on behalf of two others as applicants, seeking an order of 
mandamus to compel the respondent to investigate the allegation of bribery/extortion and 
other investigative malpractices alleged against some police officers, which the respondent 
had refused or neglected to investigate. The court held that the NGO had no locus standi to 




 applicants, as its civil rights or 
obligations were not in danger. The case typifies the setback that the issue of locus standi is 
giving to human rights NGOs in their bid to assist the indigent to enforce their rights.  
It has been argued that ‘there should be a very broad and liberal interpretation of Section 6(6) 
to make it accord with the preamble to the Constitution and a relax of the extreme legalism 
and the undue rigidity involved in the concept of locus standi at least where constitutional 
issues are called in question…’49 Given the divergent interpretations of locus standi in some 
of the cases that have come before the apex court in Nigeria,
50
 it has moreover been suggested 
that section 6(6) be amended to put the controversies to rest, and in order to allow more 





3.5 Lack of Assertiveness  
 
Under the Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, 
(Guideline 13 on the right of equal access to justice), it was noted that the most important tool 
for people living in poverty to defend themselves against human rights abuses is court 
protection, yet that even if legal assistance is provided for them, they often lack the capacity 
to assert themselves in court.
52
  Indeed, people living in poverty suffer exclusion, and the lack 
of a voice as a result of poverty so that even if they have access to courts,
53
 they often lack the 
necessary assertiveness to have their human rights enforced.
54
 
In a developing country such as Nigeria, the legal process – and in particular the adversarial 
procedure - tends to intimidate the litigant, who feels alienated from the system. A poor 
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3.6 Corruption  
 
The incidence of corruption which has plagued the judicial system in Nigeria relates to 




Corruption in the justice administration system in Nigeria takes many forms. These include 
the acceptance of gratification or other considerations by the presiding judge or magistrate to 
influence the decision in the case in favour of one of the parties, collusion between litigants 
(often the plaintiffs) and the court bailiffs, faking actual service of court process and forged 
endorsements of service in the court records, with the aim of ensuring the non-appearance of 
the defendant to defend the suit, such that the plaintiff can obtain default judgment against the 
real defendant, who has no knowledge of the suit.
57
   
Also, corrupt practices may characterize every stage of filing and processing new suits before 
they are assigned for hearing. Litigants may have to pay bribes to court officials for speedy 
processing of their matters, to get the suit officially recorded in the Registry, to get a writ 
issued, signed and endorsed, to get bailiffs to effect service of court processes and file 
necessary affidavits of service, to obtain assignment of cases to the appropriate judge and to 
fix a date for mentioning of the case in court.
58
   The various stages of filing and actual 
assignment of cases for hearing may be subject to corrupt practices by litigants and their 
lawyers who offer gratification to court officials and in some cases to the judicial officers 
themselves, for the purpose of facilitating speedy processing of a procedure or to obstruct or 
delay its processing. The choice of judge or magistrate who is to hear the matter may be 
influenced, with the aim of perverting the course of justice. In criminal matters, corrupt 
practices also influence the granting or refusal of bail to accused persons. Bail may sometimes 
depend on the ability to pay gratification, while accused persons who cannot pay may be 
denied bail or be given onerous bail conditions, which may be difficult to fulfil.
59
 
Court bailiffs, who are central to service of court processes and the execution of judgments in 
Nigeria have been particularly identified as the most mischievous and corrupt personnel of the 
judiciary, who act as barriers to speedy trials and dispensation of justice.
60
  
The Justice Kayode Esho Judicial Panel set up in December 1993 by the late dictator, General 
Sani Abacha, investigated various allegations of corruption against some judicial officers in 
Nigeria. The Panel issued a damning report against some judicial officers, and recommended 
the "withdrawal" of 47 judicial officers comprising eight Chief Judges, 21 High Court Judges 
and 18 Magistrates.
61
   The report of the Panel was not considered by the government until 
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 during the regime of Olusegun Obasanjo. As a result of the long delay, the 
National Judicial Council (NJC)
63
 set up another five-man committee which later reviewed 
the recommendations of the Esho Panel report and confirmed the indictment of two Chief 
Judges and four High Court Judges, while absolving two other judges of blame.
64
 
Official findings of corruption in the Nigerian justice system abound. In the 2006 Assessment 
of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System in three Nigerian States by the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, one of the findings was that ‘the more corruption the less 
the trust; the less trust the more people accept bribery as a given fact when dealing with 
justice sector institutions.’65 In the technical report on the Nigerian Court Procedures Project, 
corrupt personnel among lawyers, litigants and judges were generally agreed as one of the 





Likewise, in the Annual Report of Nigeria’s Public Complaints Commission,68 some of the 
complaints handled included allegations of extortion by court officials, demand for 
gratifications and suppression of appeal by a judicial officer.
69
  
As noted above, corruption in whatever form affects people living in poverty most, and shuts 
them out from access to justice. Moreover, public perceptions of the integrity and 
performance of the justice system are crucial to maintaining respect for the rule of law and the 
role of the courts in a healthy democracy.
70
 Having one’s case before an independent and 
impartial court or institution is an integral part of the right to a fair hearing.
71
 Lack of 
impartiality and independence of the judiciary is often linked to corruption. In fact, 





3.7 Inefficient Administration of Justice 
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Probably the greatest problem with the Nigerian judiciary is the excruciatingly slow pace of 
justice – as a result of which parties have to be present in courts on countless occasions from 
the filing of the case before its actual conclusion.
73
 The Rules were made not only as a guide 
for bringing fundamental rights enforcement actions, but essentially for speedier hearing of 
cases compared to other civil cases. In the technical report on the Nigerian Court Procedures 
Project conducted in 2001, it was found that civil matters such as personal injuries/tort cases 




The said technical report also found that numerous actual delays in civil proceedings can 
cause a matter to be protracted to between 7 to 20 years.
75
 The case of Wilson Bolaji Olaleye 
v. NNPC,
76
 for instance took 13 years before judgment was given and damages awarded to a 
dead victim of a kerosene explosion and his dependants. In Ariori v. Elemo,
77
 the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria ordered a retrial de novo of the case after 20 years of litigation on the ground 
that the trial High Court’s inordinate delay (of 15 years) had occasioned a miscarriage of 
justice. The report noted other causes of prolonged delays when matters are adjourned sine 
die.
78
 Trial courts often resort to this procedure when they are awaiting the decision of a 
superior court (the Supreme Court in most cases) in matters in which issues in respect of 
interlocutory appeals are pending.
79
The effect of the slow pace of justice affects people living 
in poverty most, as they cannot fund litigation spanning over a long period of time. A 
fundamental rights enforcement case may last for an average of five years or may even be 
prolonged for as long as the rich defendant wants. 
Affirming the adverse effect of the inefficient administration of justice in Nigeria, Hon. 
Justice T. Akinola Aguda stated as follows: ‘The whole system of administration of justice is 
heavily weighted against the vast majority of the people, who are unable to afford the expense 
of any search after justice. If however the poor is foolhardy enough to enter the temple of 
justice, he and his family may regret it for the rest of their lives. For in the process-in the 
pursuit of what he considers to be just- he may become bankrupt and die a pauper. Because, 
no matter how little a claim may be if one of the parties is a wealthy person or is the State, 
such a case may traverse eight courts in between 5 and 20 years’.80  
Criminal trials in Nigeria are also bogged down by inordinate delay.
81
 Poor accused persons 
are the worst affected by having to spend long periods in detention awaiting trial,
82
 especially 
owing to an inability to afford legal representation. The 2005 Report of the National Working 
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 See Hon. Dr. T. Akinola Aguda (1987), The Jurisprudence of Unequal Justice, A Foundational Lecture 
delivered at the Lagos State University, pp. 4 and 6. 
81
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Group on Prison Reforms and Decongestions,
83
 indicated that 64 percent of the inmates of 
Nigerian prisons are awaiting trial, and that most spend between two to fifteen years in prison 
awaiting trial.  
However, in the High Court of Lagos State of Nigeria, the case flow in civil litigation has 
been streamlined, improved and automated, under the Civil Process Improvement & 
Automation Project commenced in 2006.
84
 Under this project, the entire civil litigation case 
flow from filing to final disposition has been improved upon through the Court Automated 
Information Management System (CAIS). Disposition standards of fundamental rights cases 
have now been put at within 6 months, while other general civil cases are said to be concluded 
within 12 months.
85
 It is to be noted that the CAIS only covers a few of the judicial divisions 
in the State.
86
 Moreover, in interviews with the authors, lawyers, human rights activists and 
human rights NGOs in Lagos State claimed that in practice, fundamental rights cases are not 
concluded within 6 months as stipulated and expressed the view that the situation has only 
improved marginally.  
In a 2006 technical assessment of the Integrity and Capacity of the Justice System earlier 
referred to, the report indicated that the length of trial was the most serious problem of the 
country’s justice system when compared with other factors hampering justice delivery.87 In its 
findings, the report stated that ‘Court users who had more negative perceptions and 
experience when it came to seeking access to justice, were likely not to use the courts when 
needed’, and that ‘inefficient courts are likely to encourage citizens not to seek solutions in 
accordance with the law but to resort to other, often illicit, means including corruption’.88 
 
 
3.8 Mistrust  
 
In his final report in 1996, the Special Rapporteur on human rights and extreme poverty, 
Leandro Despouy, in addition to some of the issues raised above,
89
 included mistrust among 
the obstacles barring access to justice for the very poor. He stated that this stemmed from their 
experience of the justice system.
90
 According to the Special Rapporteur, ‘Whether they are 
defendants or accused, they often see their petitions turned against them: "There is a strong 
possibility that they would be reproached with some unlawful aspect of everyday life quite 
unrelated to the grounds for the petition; the poorest have learned that, in seeking their due in 
a given matter, it is often preferable not to be in the wrong in some other respect".
91
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In the technical report on the Nigerian Court Procedures Project referred to above, it was 
generally agreed among litigants and lawyers that people living in poverty are not fairly 
treated by the civil justice system in Nigeria.
92
 There is consequently a low level of public 
trust in the courts and declining willingness of citizens to use the courts to protect their 
rights.
93
  Thus people living in poverty do not access the legal system willingly unless they 
are forced into it as an accused or as a defendant in a law suit.
94
 They see the law as an 





4. Improving Human Rights Enforcement in Nigeria Through Access to Justice 
 
Access to justice is crucial to human rights enforcement, and is increasingly recognized as a 
component of poverty reduction programmes.
96
 Yet for people living in poverty in Nigeria 
today, access to justice for the enforcement of their human rights is the exception rather than 
the rule. Improving access to justice requires reforms in the justice system. These should be 
based on the lessons learned by other states that are confronted with similar problems. In 
particular, the Indian experience with Public Interest Litigation is worth examining. 
  
 
4.1. Judicial Reforms 
 
As discussed above, litigation in Nigeria is associated with inordinate delays. This problem is 
further compounded by the long trajectory of a case through the judicial hierarchy from the 
High Court to the Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court. The current chain or 
hierarchy of courts in Nigeria may unduly prolong both litigation and prosecution in criminal 
trials, especially in view of the slow pace of the administration of the justice system.  
Timely dispensation of justice may be facilitated by justice sector reforms that would shorten 
the length of judicial ladders to be traversed in order to exhaust judicial remedies.  
One option for such a reform is the elimination of the Court of Appeal from the current 
judicial hierarchy in Nigeria, with the High Court and Supreme Court remaining as the only 
superior courts of record. As a result appeals would lie directly from the High Court, which is 
the court of first instance in human rights cases, to the Supreme Court, which is the final 
court. Alternatively, the Court of Appeal might continue to exist, but be bypassed in 
constitutional and human rights cases.  
A third scenario is the establishment of a Constitutional Court with competence in 
constitutional and human rights matters. This would relieve the Supreme Court of Nigeria 
from the burden of workload which results from its serving as the final appellate court on all 
legal and constitutional matters. An additional benefit of this scenario would be that a 
constitutional court is likely to pay special attention to human rights matters and to avoid 
excessive legalism in their interpretation.  
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In addition, any proposed judicial reforms will require a thorough examination of the current 
justice system in order to determine where inordinate delays usually occur. The justice 
administration system should be completely overhauled to address inefficiency; and the rules 
of procedure should be reviewed to remove technicalities which breed delay.  
 
 
4.2. Public Interest Litigation 
 
Nigeria can learn from other developing countries that have been exploring ways to improve 
access to justice for people living in poverty. A particularly promising experience is that of 
Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India. PIL as practised in India has been described as a 
doctrine of procedural relaxations in cases of human rights violations, in order to make both 
access to justice and furnishing of proof easier.
97
 Through an innovative use of judicial 
power
98
, it represents a classic example of the courts becoming directly involved in solving 
the problem of legal services to the poor through their court rules.
99
 While the focus is mostly 
on procedural liberalizations, there is also a strong principled substance, leading for example 
to the finding that the State is under a constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation 
of the fundamental rights of any person, particularly when he belongs to the weaker sections 
of the community and is unable to wage a legal battle against a strong and powerful opponent 
who is exploiting him.
100
 PIL in India can thus be described as a platform for vindicating the 
rights of people living in poverty.  Its main characteristics are the liberalization of rules of 
standing, the relaxation of procedural requirements of access, the appointment of 
commissioners for the purpose of gathering evidence, its non-adversarial nature, the 
innovative character of relief and remedies, and the Court’s supervision of its own orders. 
 
 
Locus standi liberalization 
 
The Indian Supreme Court declared that the rules governing locus standi, developed by 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, are manifestly uncongenial to the social and cultural setting of 
India.
101
 Starting with the locus classicus decision in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India,
102
 
popularly known as the Judges’ Transfer case, the locus standi of citizens to institute public 
interest cases before the Supreme Court was upheld. It became firmly established that where a 
legal wrong or a legal injury is caused to a person or to a determinate class of persons by 
reason of violation of their constitutional or legal rights, and such person or determinate class 
of persons is by reason of poverty or disability in a socially or economically disadvantaged 
position and unable to approach the Court for relief, any member of the public or a social 
action group acting bona fide can maintain an application in a High Court or the Supreme 
Court seeking judicial redress for the legal wrong or injury caused to such person or 
determinate class of persons.
103
 The strict rule of locus standi therefore became relaxed in two 
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ways, representative standing and citizen standing.
104
 Representative standing occurs in 
situations where a person is by reason of poverty or disability in a socially or economically 
disadvantaged position and unable to approach the Court for relief. In such cases, a third party 
is allowed to prosecute the matter on his behalf.
105
 Citizen’s standing is also granted to any 
member of the public with sufficient interest to maintain an action for redress of a public 
wrong or injury caused by an act or omission of the State or a public authority which is 
contrary to either the Constitution or the law.
106
  
In sharp contract with the strict position of the Nigerian courts on locus standi as described 
above, the Indian Supreme Court has thus been making human rights truly ‘human’ by 
granting other people the legal right to defend the rights of fellow human beings.
107
 Some 
Nigerian judges already see the benefit of locus standi liberalization. In Ozekhome v. The 
President,
108
 the High Court in a rare move gave standing to a legal practitioner to sue on 
behalf of his clients who were being detained without trial by the then military government. 
As a decision of the High Court the case however cannot serve as precedent. Instead, a 
relaxation of locus standi rules through an amendment to section 6 (6) of the Nigerian 
Constitution is desirable. 
 
 
Relaxation of procedural requirements of access 
 
A related feature of Indian PIL is the Supreme Court’s dispensing with formal writs drawn in 
legal language
109
 despite the fact that there are formal rules for the filing of petitions.
110
  The 
treating of ordinary letters, telegrams or even a post card
111
 as a petition was initiated 
informally and followed on an ad hoc basis by some of the judges of the Indian apex Court. It 
became institutionalized by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 
decided in December 1981.
112
 The Court consequently held in this and a host of other cases
113
 
that procedure being merely a handmaiden of justice, it should not stand in the way of access 
to justice to the weaker sections of Indian humanity. It became established that where the poor 
and the disadvantaged are concerned, the Supreme Court will not insist on a regular writ 
petition, such that a simple letter addressed by a public spirited individual or a social action 
group acting pro bono publico would suffice to activate the jurisdiction of the court.
114
 The 




 This is irrespective of whether the letter was 
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addressed to the court or an individual judge.
117
 ‘The Supreme Court thus evolved what has 
come to be known as "epistolary jurisdiction".
118
  
Meanwhile, in Nigeria, the procedure for fundamental rights enforcement remains technical, 
cumbersome and lawyer-centred as described above. The drawbacks of this system are 
accentuated by inconsistent judicial decisions some of which tend to strict adherence to 
procedural laws whereas others promote liberal construction of those laws. In Raymond 
Dongtoe v. Civil Service Commission of Plateau State,
119
 the Supreme Court of Nigeria held 
that where a special procedure is prescribed for the enforcement of a particular right or 
remedy, non-compliance with or departure from such a procedure is fatal to the enforcement 
of that remedy.
120
 This however conflicts with the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in 
Saude v. Abdullahi,
121
 where it held that there are no clear words that the Rules were the only 
procedure by which redress could be sought. So adopting a particular procedure will not 
impeach the remedy sought. In that particular case, the originating summons was signed by 
the legal practitioner to the respondent instead of the presiding judge as required by the Rules, 
and it was held not to impeach the proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights.  
This position rejecting excessive legalism was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Olisa 
Agbakoba v. The Director of State Security Service,
122
 where the Court held that the end 
purpose of the Rules is to ensure that where infringement of fundamental rights has been 
complained of or threatened, there is a speedy enforcement of such rights and simplification 
of the procedure for dealing with such complaints.  
It is submitted that Nigerian courts should allow claimants in fundamental rights cases to 
come to court by any convenient means, without strict adherence to the Rules. It has been 
recognized that these Rules, first put in place in 1980, are due for a comprehensive review, to 




Some Nigerian judges are already on this track. In Alhaji Mohammed Shaaba Lafiaji v. 
Military Administrator of Kwara State,
124
 the High Court seemed to fully appreciate the 
importance of enforcing rights when it held that matters concerning the enforcement of 
fundamental rights of citizens are so important that the mode of access to courts to enforce 
these basic rights should not be restricted to one particular means nor the procedure used in 
the attainment of the enforcement of these basic rights be made cumbersome and technical. 
Also, in Nnamdi Azikiwe University & Ors v. Nwafor,
125
 the Court of Appeal held that in 
order to render meaningful the provisions of the Constitution dealing with fundamental rights, 
the court should not be tied to the apron strings of the principle of practice and procedure 
governing trial of normal civil cases such as parties being bound by their pleadings,
126
 and 
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 See Edoba B. Omoregie, Enforcement of Fundamental Rights in Nigeria: Proposals for Reforms, University 
of Benin Law Journal, (2005) 8 (1) U.B.L.J. pp. 100-105. 
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that in the matter of enforcement of the fundamental rights, courts are less slavish to the rules 
of court; rather they use them as a handmaiden to do substantial justice.  





Non-adversarial system of evidence through expert committees 
 
The Indian Supreme Court moreover reasoned that where one of the parties to litigation is 
weak and helpless and does not possess adequate social and material resources, he or she is 
bound to be at a disadvantage under the adversarial system, not only because of the difficulty 
in getting competent legal representation, but more than anything else because of the inability 
to produce relevant evidence before the Court. It was obvious to the court that the problem of 
proof presents difficulties to vindicate the rights of the poor.
128
 This led to the practice of 
appointing diverse people such as lawyers, professors of law, court officials, journalists, 
bureaucrats, district judges, mental health professionals, experts and bodies of experts as 
commissioners in order to gather material facts on behalf of the poor petitioner(s)
129
 and to 
make a report to the court, which might also contain recommendations.
130
 This practice of 
appointing socio-legal commissions of inquiry for the purpose of gathering relevant evidence 
was institutionalized by reason of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bandhua Mutki 
Morcha v. Union of India.
131
 The reports of the commissioners serve as prima facie evidence 
of the facts and data stated in those reports, although it is left for the court to determine what 
weight it should attach to those in light of the various affidavits filed in the proceedings.
132
 
Moreover, the role played by the Court under PIL in India is more assertive than in traditional 
actions
133
 as the ‘judge is given a greater participatory role in trials so as to place the poor as 
far as possible on a footing of equality with the rich in the administration of justice’.134  
In Nigeria on the other hand, courts adhere strictly to the adversarial procedure inherited from 
Britain, where the court is seen as an unbiased umpire who must not descend into the arena of 
justice. As a result, the burden of proof remains a serious hurdle for people living in poverty 
in Nigeria who wish to enforce their fundamental rights. 
Another important aspect of PIL that deserves to be mentioned is the practice by courts of 
appointing lawyers – including very senior lawyers-  as amicus curiae. Where PIL is initiated 
in person, the courts also appoint lawyers to act as amicus curiae thus indirectly providing 
legal aid to the poor.
135
 They assist the court to sift out relevant facts from documents and 
pleadings, bring out the legal issues involved, narrow down the issues and sharpen the focus 
of discussion.
136
 The lawyers discharge this duty professionally without charging a fee, and 
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they feel honoured for being called upon by the court to assist.
137
 This adds beyond doubt to 
the quality of justice that goes to people living in poverty, who would ordinarily not have 
been able to afford the services of lawyers in the first place, but now enjoy the services of 







Under PIL, the Indian Supreme Court devised innovative remedies. The reliefs granted are 
corrective rather than compensatory and are focused on the future.
139
 They include detailed 
and far-reaching directions to specific government bodies or agencies, judicial monitoring of 
State institutions, granting of damages to victims of government brutality and the unique 
order of interim compensation,
140
 among others. In the case of Bandhua Mukti Morcha, the 
Supreme Court made an order giving various directions for identifying, releasing and 
rehabilitating labourers who were held in debt bondage. Directions were also made for 
observance of labour laws,
141
 creating legal awareness, providing safe drinking water, 
provision of medical assistance and educational facilities.
142
 In Hussainara Khatoon v. State 
of Bihar,
143
 concerning pre-trial detention, the Supreme Court directed the State government 
to prepare an annual census of prisoners on trial as of 31 October of each year and submit it to 
the High Court, and further directed the High Court to ensure early disposal of cases where 
prisoners have been in detention for too long. PIL has also been used to invoke legal aid for 
the poor in a novel way. The court for instance has held that the right to legal aid services is 
incidental to the right to life in Article 21.
144
 In Khatri v. State of Bihar II ,
145
 the Supreme 
Court held that the State is under an obligation to provide free legal service to an indigent 
accused not only at the stage of trial but also at the stage where he is produced before the 
Magistrate as well as when he is remanded from time to time. The court further held that if a 
trial is held without affording legal aid to an indigent accused at State expense, the conviction 
will be set aside.  
For this reason PIL has been viewed as ‘a strategic arm of the legal aid movement intended to 
bring justice within the reach of those who, on account of their indigency, illiteracy, and lack 
of resources, were not able to reach the courts.’146 This is yet another reason why introducing 
PIL in Nigeria would be highly beneficial. 
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Another commendable feature of the Indian PIL is the practice of giving innovative 
interpretations to constitutional provisions, expanding the scope of fundamental rights in 
order to increase their meaning for people living in poverty. A case in point is the right to life 
in article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In the landmark case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of 
India,
147
 the Supreme Court interpreted the right to life to include the right to a means of 
livelihood and the right to human dignity. Also in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of 
India
148
 the Supreme Court upheld the right of bonded labourers to live in dignity and free of 
exploitation. Of particular importance to enhancing ESC rights is the case of Francis Coralie 
v. Union Territory of Delhi
149
 where the Court also held that the right to life under Article 21 
includes the right to live with human dignity with the basic necessities of life appertaining to 
it, such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, facilities for reading and writing, etc. The right 
to health was also upheld by the apex court in Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v. State of 
West Bengal,
150
 as an integral part of the right to life. The Supreme Court’s beneficial 
construction of constitutional provisions in its PIL jurisdiction in the above manner enabled it 
to overcome the non-justiciability of ESC rights under the Indian Constitution.
151
  
This stands in contrast to the Nigerian courts that have consistently stated that the Directive 
Principles of State Policy provisions in Chapter II of the Nigerian Constitution are not 
justiciable, and have moreover extends this to the ESC rights provisions in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, despite their incorporation into Nigerian law. 152  
 
 
Court’s Supervision of Its Own Orders 
 
Making far-reaching pronouncements is one thing, having them executed is another. The 
Court’s dependency for the execution of its orders on state agencies that are not necessarily 
favourably disposed, proved to be a major obstacle. In response, the Indian Supreme Court 
created monitoring mechanisms adapted to specific cases. For example in the case of 
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India,
153
 concerning labour matters, the Supreme Court 
gave detailed directives concerning actions to be taken on the welfare of the quarry workers 
and appointed the Joint-Secretary in the Ministry of Labour in order to secure implementation 
of the directive of court and requested him to visit the quarry after three months and ascertain 
compliance or otherwise with the directives of court. In PIL cases, the court also has the 
practice of not disposing of matters by one-off judgments. Instead, the court passes a series of 
short orders and sees to their effective implementation before a final judgment is handed 
down in the matter.
154
 This methodology has been termed by the court a ‘continuing 
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mandamus’.155 At the post-judgment stage, the court sometimes retains the case file for the 
purpose of monitoring compliance with its orders.
156
 Where detailed guidelines are laid down 




The Nigerian conception of the separation of powers relegates this function to the executive 
under its responsibility for the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and all laws.
158
 
With the exception of the court’s possibility to mete out punishment for contempt,159 the 
enforcement of court orders in respect of fundamental rights thus depends on the cooperation 
of the executive. It therefore follows that Nigeria needs an activist judiciary to be able to go 
the way of the Indian judiciary in PIL, both in terms of innovative construction of the 
Constitution and radical procedural liberalization that will throw open the gate of justice to 





The example of PIL in India clearly shows that it is possible for the judiciary in a developing 
country to make a significant contribution to fighting human rights violations specifically 
affecting people living in poverty. The analysis of the Nigerian case has shown on the one 
hand that the basic formal ingredients for human rights enforcement – a bill of rights and a 
procedure to deal with violations – are present, and on the other hand that numerous serious 
obstacles hamper the enforcement of fundamental rights by people living in poverty.  
This paper suggests that this creates a great challenge for the Nigerian legislator and judiciary, 
to make the necessary reforms – learning from the successes and mistakes of India and other 
countries – that would enable real access to justice to all who need it in Nigeria. 
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